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Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

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Abstract Western scholarship on early Chinese thought has tended to either dismiss 9 the foundational role of metaphor or to see it as a uniquely Chinese mode of 10apprehending the world. This article argues that, while human cognition is in fact 11 profoundly dependent on imagistic conceptual structures, such dependence is by no 12means a unique feature of Chinese thought. The article reviews empirical evidence 13supporting the claims that human thought is fundamentally imagistic; that 14 sensorimotor schemas are often used to structure our understanding of abstract 15concepts; that these schemas can be selectively combined to result in novel 16structures; and that there are inextricable connections between body, emotion, and 17thought in both everyday and philosophical cognition. It also provides a review of a 18 recent trend where, explicitly or not, scholars from a variety of backgrounds have 19begun to take metaphor more seriously as a foundational bearer of philosophical 20meaning in early China. 21

**Keywords** Metaphor  $\cdot$  Emotion  $\cdot$  Chinese thought  $\cdot$  Chinese philosophy  $\cdot$  Embodied cognition

Much has been said in recent sinological literature concerning the role of metaphor 25in early Chinese discourse. To be sure, scholars from analytic philosophical 26backgrounds have been prone to ignore or dismiss the importance of metaphors 27and analogies in early Chinese argumentation, attempting to convert metaphoric 28utterances into literal equivalents that could then be evaluated and compared on the 29basis of logical coherence. Outside of philosophy departments, however, a much 30 more common position has been to see metaphor and analogy as important, but also 31 uniquely Chinese, modes of apprehending the world. According to this view, 32 Western thought since the time of ancient Greece has been literal, analytic, logical, 33

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Department of Asian Studies, University of British Columbia, 2329 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada e-mail: edward.slingerland@ubc.ca and dualistic; Chinese thought, in contrast, is portrayed as "holistic" and uniquely 34 image-based. In this article I will argue that both this view and the analytic 35 philosophical approach are mistaken and have served to distort our view of early 36 Chinese argumentation. Although metaphor and analogy do indeed play a foundational, 37 irreducible role in early Chinese rhetoric, this dependence of image-schematic structures 38 is by no means a unique feature of early China or "the East." 39

I will begin by briefly characterizing some views in the field concerning the role 40 of metaphor in early Chinese thought, including an encouraging recent trend where, 41 explicitly or not, scholars from a variety of backgrounds have begun to take 42 metaphor more seriously as a foundational bearer of philosophical meaning in early 43 China without unduly exoticizing the notion. Making reference to a large body of 44 empirical work from a variety of fields in the cognitive sciences, I will then present 45the case for the claim that all human cognition is heavily dependent on imagistic 46 conceptual structures and cross-domain projections. My critique of the Enlightenment 47 ideal of disembodied reason will focus on four important aspects of the embodied model 48of cognition and language that are relevant to the issue of metaphor and argumentation: 49that thought is fundamentally imagistic; that concrete sensorimotor schemas are often 50used to structure our understanding of abstract concepts (conceptual metaphor theory); 51that these schemas can be selectively combined to result in novel structures (conceptual 52blending theory); and that there are inextricable connections between body, emotion, 53and thought in everyday human cognition. I will then turn to a more specific discussion 54of metaphor and argumentation in early China, including a brief analysis of an example 55drawn from the Mencius. It is my hope that the empirical literature review, combined 56with the case example, will make it clear that what is unusual about early Chinese 57thinkers is not that they relied upon metaphor or metaphoric blends, but rather that 58they devoted a great deal of conscious attention to developing vivid and consistent sets 59of interlocking metaphors and metaphorical blends, which makes metaphor and blend 60 analysis a particularly crucial tool when approaching these texts. I will then conclude 61 with some remarks concerning the contemporary relevance of the early Chinese 62 approach to both philosophical rhetoric and ethical self-cultivation. 63

#### 1 Metaphor in Early Chinese Thought

There is, of course, a long tradition of theorizing about metaphor in the West, as well65as the relationship between metaphor and analogy or allegory (see Johnson 1981a;66Ortony 1993). Below I will argue for a fairly broad conception of metaphor as the67use of one, usually concrete domain to structure our understanding of another,68usually more abstract domain. "Metaphor" understood in this sense includes what69we might otherwise label as analogy or allegory. This is roughly the understanding70of metaphor that informs most of the work on metaphor in early China.71

As Mark Johnson has observed (Johnson 1981b), the Western philosophical 72 tradition has long been characterized by a view of metaphor as philosophically 73 superfluous: a decorative rhetorical device expressing a thought capable of being 74 fully reduced to some literal equivalent, and therefore merely entertaining at best, 75 and potentially misleading at worst. Scholars of early Chinese thought trained in 76 analytic philosophy departments are typically heirs to this attitude, dismissing the 77

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

metaphorical specificity of arguments in early Chinese thought in the belief that 78what really matters is extracting their abstract, logical, and propositional essence 79(see, for instance, Shun 1997: 103-107 or Hutton 2002: 169). For at least the last 80 quarter of a century, however, there have also been a growing number of scholars of 81 early Chinese thought who argue that the key to grasping arguments and concepts in 82 early China is to focus on and unpack the specific metaphors and images that are 83 deployed in the texts, rather than attempting to "translate" Chinese arguments into 84 rational propositions that could be modeled by formal logic. 85

Some early pioneers in this regard include Harold Oshima (Oshima 1983), who 86 makes a strong case that the concept of "mind" in the Zhuangzi cannot be 87 understood in isolation from the specific metaphors employed by the author, which 88 serve conceptually as a "determinate model," rather than mere rhetorical window-89 dressing. In another early study of the Zhuangzi, Robert Allinson (Allinson 1989) 90 argues at length that metaphors have an important, though non-linguistic, cognitive 91content, based on "engagement of the holistic or intuitive cognitive capacity" (36)-92an argument that parallels in many ways the cognitive linguistic model of metaphor 93 that I will be defending below.<sup>1</sup> Although he is often identified with the analytic 94philosophical approach, P.J. Ivanhoe's work (e.g., Ivanhoe 1993/2000) has always 95 emphasized the foundational role of metaphors in characterizing early Confucian 96 conceptions of human nature and self-cultivation, and his analysis of these concepts 97 is informed by careful attention to the details of the metaphors. And, to take a final 98example from a later period of Chinese thought, Donald Munro's (Munro 1988) 99 landmark study of the thought of ZHU Xi emphasizes the degree to which unpacking 100the "pictorial images" pervading ZHU Xi's discourse is crucial to understanding the 101 philosophical concepts that form the basis of his thought. 102

One could argue, then, that there seems to be a growing consensus that metaphor 103 plays a foundational role in early Chinese discourse. One primary point of 104continuing disagreement, however, concerns the manner in which we are to 105understand this use of metaphor in a comparative context: that is, whether or not it 106 represents a culturally-specific form of both rhetoric and thought that is distinctive of 107 early China, or East Asia more broadly. Below I will briefly review three positions 108 that have been taken in the scholarly literature on this question, before turning to a 109defense of metaphor as a universal and fundamental feature of human cognition. 110

#### 1.1 Metaphor in a Comparative Context: The Strong View

Many scholars who have commented on the prominence of metaphor in early 112 Chinese thought have portrayed it as a uniquely Chinese mode of discourse and 113 argumentation. To select a few representative examples, WU Kuang-ming, for one, 114 highlights the "universally recognized fact that...arguments by metaphor...are the 115 *central* and *typical* mode of argumentation in China" (Wu 1995: 35), and explains 116 this phenomenon in terms of a uniquely Chinese mode of thinking, which is 117 "concrete through and through" (40). Roger Ames similarly cites "analogical or 118

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> As a recent commentator (Chong 2007) has noted, however, Allinson makes no attempt—beyond some vague references to "the empirical evidence of science" (Allinson 1989: 385)—to connect his insights concerning the role of metaphor in the *Zhuangzi* to larger issues of human cognition.

138

correlative thinking" as "a defining feature of the [early Chinese] Confucian 119project," and claims that the "absence of a clear difference between literal and 120metaphorical language" that apparently characterizes China is related to the 121"irrelevance of our"-i.e., Western-"familiar reality/appearance distinction" (Ames 1222008; 41). Ames and his collaborators have, in turn, linked this notion to the belief 123that the Chinese operate with a uniquely "aesthetic" sense of order that is completely 124alien to Western notions of "truth," representation or logical coherence (Hall and 125Ames 1987; Rosemont and Ames 2009). Vincent Shen contrasts the focus on 126"concepts and argumentations" (Shen 2005: 11) in Western philosophy with the 127prominence in "Asian thought, especially in Chinese philosophy" of what he terms 128"Original Image-Ideas" (12), which consist of concrete "images, sounds and plots" 129(13) as opposed to abstract "pure ideas" (12). Hans-Georg Moeller, in commenting 130on the use of metaphor in the *Daodejing*, characterizes it as a uniquely "obscure" 131 method of expression through "structures of efficacy" that mirrors the structure of 132the Dao (Moeller 2006: 20), and as part of a larger distinction between the 133"autopoetic" thought of the *Daodejing* and the literalistic rationalism that characterizes 134"the Western tradition" (52). This notion that metaphorical or analogical thinking is a 135unique feature of early China, or particular thinkers in early China, is a surprisingly 136common view in our field.<sup>2</sup> 137

#### 1.2 Metaphor in a Comparative Context: A Weaker View

Two studies that were initially published in 1997 can be singled out as representing a 139weaker view concerning the cultural uniqueness of metaphor in early Chinese 140 thought, as well as the beginnings of an effort to link discussions of this topic to 141broader issues in human cognition.<sup>3</sup> Sarah Allan's The Way of Water, Sprouts of 142Virtue (1997), the first book-length treatment in the West of the systematic role of 143metaphor in early philosophical discourse, explores the foundational role that the 144 "root metaphors" of water and plants play in early Chinese philosophical discourse. 145Like many who have urged a greater focus on the specific imagery used in the early 146Chinese texts, Allan argues that the common tendency to transpose early Chinese 147 arguments into the "abstract technical terminology of European philosophical 148 discourse" (xii) obscures more than it reveals, erasing the systematic connections 149between concepts grounded in important images and analogical reasoning patterns. 150Despite her occasional suggestions that there might be something culturally unique 151about the role of metaphor in early China,<sup>4</sup> Allan's work represents an important 152

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  My primary focus here is scholarship in North America and Europe, the field with which I am most familiar, but the view that there is something uniquely Chinese about metaphorical reasoning can also be found in contemporary Chinese scholarship. See, for instance, Wang (2005), who contrasts the "image thinking" (*xiangsiwei* 象思維) that characterizes traditional Chinese thought with the focus on rational or logical thinking that one finds in the West.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Also see (Jones 1999) for a discussion of the water metaphor in early Daoism that is briefly linked to the cognitive psychology of James Hillman.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For instance, she seems to suggest at several points that analogy is a particularly Chinese way of thought, grounded in a conceptual "holism" lacking a sense of transcendence, as opposed to abstract, literal Western thought (xii, 23). It should be noted, however, that Allan apparently did not intend to portray metaphor/analogy as in any way distinctly Chinese, and has since clearly distanced herself from claims that there is anything uniquely Chinese about the use of metaphor (personal communications, 2008-2009).

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

shift in the study of metaphor in early China because she links her analysis to 153the early work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), thereby helping to bring the study 154of metaphor in early Chinese thought out of the sinological ghetto and into the 155broader context of human cognition in general. In other important work first 156published in the same year, Jean-Paul Reding (Reding 1997; cf. Reding 2004) 157displays a similarly broad perspective on the role of metaphor in early China. 158explicitly centering his discussion of metaphors of "light" and "mirror" in a cross-159cultural comparative context informed by some early work in cognitive 160linguistics. 161

While both Allan and Reding are familiar with some of the early cognitive 162linguistics literature, and recognize that metaphoric thinking is a feature of 163general human cognition rather than a unique characteristic of the "East," both 164see the function of metaphor in early Chinese philosophical discourse as being 165distinct from the West in at least one important aspect: while metaphors in the 166 West function by setting up a rhetorical connection between ontological domains 167that nonetheless continue to be perceived as distinct, early Chinese metaphors 168reflect a deeper belief in the "common principles" (Allan 1997: 23) or "basic 169unity" (Reding 2004: 136) behind the ontological domains involved.<sup>5</sup> For instance. 170Reding argues that, whereas for the early Greeks metaphor involves connections 171between clearly distinguishable ontological levels, metaphor in early China 172involves some sort of perceived "ontological connection" between domains, the 173two domains invoked in metaphor are, for the early Chinese, "shown to take a 174share in one and the same nature" (2004: 162). "Chinese metaphor," he declares, 175"does not try to establish a parallelism between two domains, but rather wants to 176show that there is a *convergence* between them" (2004: 136). Reding attributes the 177prominence of positive nature metaphors in early China to a pervasive faith in 178"natural and spontaneous processes" (162), a claim that echoes Allan's postulation 179of an "assumption that common principles governed the natural and human 180worlds" (23) as the motivating force behind the prominence of "root metaphors" 181 involving water and plant growth. To put this another way, Reding is essentially 182arguing that Western thinkers have always been conscious that their metaphors are 183 "just" metaphors, and therefore have always viewed them with a degree of 184suspicion, whereas the early Chinese embraced their metaphors in an unselfcon-185scious manner, seeing them as genuine expressions of ontological truths mirroring 186the normative model of the natural world.<sup>6</sup> 187

There are at least two problems with this view. To begin with, it simply is not the 188 case that metaphors drawn from the natural world are viewed as unambiguously 189 positive models for the human world: in early China Xunzi, to take one prominent 190 example, celebrates the artificial and man-made, and in fact the normative status of 191 the natural as opposed to the artificial is one of the central debates of the Warring 192

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This claim is more implicit in Allan, but has to be assumed to understand her distinction between "abstract" Western thought and "holistic" Chinese thought.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Pauline Yu's claim that the Chinese entirely lack metaphor is based on this sort of supposed failure to maintain a distance between the domains represented in metaphorical expressions (Yu 1987); see (Bokenkamp 1989) for a helpful discussion and critique of Yu's position, as well as a more general argument, similar to one I hope to make here, against the view that the Chinese use of metaphor is in some way "mysterious" or culturally unique.

Edward Slingerland

209

States period.<sup>7</sup> A deeper problem, however, is involved in the claim that the Chinese 193were somehow unique, or at least different from the ancient Greeks, in taking their 194metaphors seriously. To argue in this way is to take the conceit of Western 195philosophy-its ancient ambition of directly mirroring reality in a literal, though 196abstract fashion—at face value, and to underestimate the extent to which, even in the 197West, meaning and perception are fundamentally shaped by imagistic structures 198arising from our embodied experience of the world. Whatever Western philosophers 199may *claim* about their attitudes toward metaphor, one of the most important 200contributions of the modern cognitive linguistic movement has been to demonstrate 201how the thought and arguments of Western philosophers and scientists, from 202Aristotle to Einstein, have been fundamentally predicated on metaphors taken to 203reveal something important about the world-indeed, such metaphors are often not 204recognized as metaphors precisely because they are taken to be literally true.<sup>8</sup> By 205refusing to accept the Western philosophical tradition's self-conception as accurate, 206we can begin to perceive the deeper commonalities in the role of metaphor across 207cultures and time periods. 208

1.3 Metaphor and Chinese Discourse: The Weakest (or Really Strong) View

The view of metaphor and early Chinese discourse that I want to argue for here can 210be viewed either as considerably weaker than the views described above, or radically 211more extreme, depending on the perspective. It is the weakest in the sense of 212maintaining that there is no substantive manner in which we can distinguish the use 213of metaphor in early Chinese philosophical discourse from its use in the West: both 214Chinese and Western philosophers, like people more generally, rely upon metaphors 215to both formulate and communicate their views, and take these metaphors to be 216"true" in the sense that metaphors are perceived as telling us something about the 217world. The very real and important difference between China and the West with 218regard to the official philosophical attitude toward metaphor, as documented by 219Reding and others, can thus better be seen as a reflection of a lack of self-awareness 220on the part of Western thinkers-and a blindness to the metaphoric nature of 221language taken to be literal-than as an accurate account of different philosophical 222and rhetorical strategies. 223

The sense in which my position might be seen as actually *really* strong is that I 224 will argue that both the "strong" and "weaker" portrayals of metaphorical reasoning 225 and argumentation in early Chinese described above are based on a false dichotomy— 226 the literal, logical West versus metaphorical, concrete China—that, in turn, grows out of 227 a fundamentally mistaken conception of the nature of human cognition. The basic 228 problem with these analyses is that they ultimately take for granted the "Western" 229

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See (Puett 2001) on the common error in the study of early Chinese thought of taking a specific argument for a contested point of view as a reflection of some sort of timeless cultural assumption. Metaphors celebrating the normative value of the natural worlds are part of *arguments*, not assumptions, as the Mencius-Gaozi debate analyzed below makes quite clear.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See, for instance, (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) on foundational metaphors that have structured Western philosophical thought since Plato, or (Dunbar 2000) and (Brown 2003) on the foundational role that metaphor and analogy plays in the formulation of scientific hypotheses and interpretation of experimental evidence.

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

assumption that the literal versus metaphorical distinction really means 230something: that is, that there is a class of words or expressions—the "literal"— 231that convey an abstract, amodal meaning that, in turn, refers in some direct way to 232categories in the world. These "literal" meanings can then be contrasted with 233"metaphorical" expressions that merely coordinate or juxtapose one domain with 234another, but do not necessarily tell us anything about the world. Taking empirical 235work on human cognition seriously-as I will argue below we should-means 236moving beyond this dichotomy and viewing *all* human language and cognition as, 237

to a greater or lesser degree, imagistic. 238In the sections below I will explore some relevant work coming out of various 239branches of the cognitive sciences that suggests that we are *all* thoroughly dependent 240on "body thinking," as WU Kuang-ming 1992 refers to it, and that the Enlightenment 241ideal of disembodied reason and literal representation of the world is nothing more 242than a philosophical conceit. Conceits matter, of course. As Reding 2004 has 243observed, the devaluation of metaphor that can be traced back to early Greek 244philosophy sent Western thought down certain paths that never appeared to the early 245Chinese. Similarly, as I will mention briefly below, the questions and concerns that 246have consumed analytic philosophy in the post-Enlightenment West very much grow 247out of its rather impoverished conception of human cognition. As we come to realize 248precisely how impoverished this conception is, we come also to a greater 249appreciation of the contemporary relevance and importance of early Chinese 250thought. Working with a more embodied, non-dualist model of cognition, the early 251Chinese focused on philosophical problematiques and developed styles of self-252cultivation that modern scholars of cognitive science and moral psychology are now 253gradually coming to appreciate. For instance, as many scholars have observed, early 254Chinese thinkers tend to focus more on practical, spontaneous "knowing-how" than 255abstract, theoretical "knowing that" (Ryle 1949). This early focus on "know how" 256takes on new significance in this century as cognitive scientists come to learn more 257about the crucial importance of implicit, automatic systems for human cognition, 258which are subserved by different brain systems than those dedicated to explicit 259knowledge, and which also seem to be much more important for the guidance of 260everyday activity than explicit systems. Because this form of knowledge has been 261relatively neglected in most Western philosophical traditions, modern cognitive 262scientists interested in how this sort of knowledge is acquired, how it is activated, or 263how it is experienced phenomenologically have begun turning to the rich history of 264theorizing about "know-how" that one can find in early China and later East Asian 265traditions.9 266

We must always keep in mind, however, that the very relevance of early Chinese 267 thought for questions such as this is predicated on the assumption—conscious or 268 otherwise—that the same mechanisms of embodied cognition are at work for all 269 human beings, modern or ancient, "Eastern" or "Western." The characterization of 270 Chinese thought as uniquely and distinctly metaphorical—the "strong" view that 271

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See, for example, (Varela et al. 1993) and (Haidt 2005). Scientifically-literate sinologists have also been making these sorts of connections: see especially (Munro 2005), (Bruya 2010), and Slingerland forthcoming (2011).

seems so common in our field-is, I believe, part of a larger trend that sets up a 272caricatured China or "the East" as a monolithic, incommensurable Other, 273fundamentally different from an equally caricatured "West." China is said to be 274characterized by a "holistic" conception of the self and the cosmos-in contrast to 275Western mind-body, appearance-reality, immanent-transcendent dualisms-that 276renders such Western concepts as "religion" or "essence" completely alien to the 277Chinese context. China is said to possess an entirely different concept of time, space, 278and logic than the West, and to lack a sense of individualism or psychological 279interiority.<sup>10</sup> I have come to refer to this trend as "reverse Orientalism," in that these 280 claims echo those made by classic Orientalists, such as Hegel, but are presented with 281an interesting normative flip: whereas Hegel viewed these features of Chinese 282culture negatively—as evidence that the Chinese were a childlike, naturally "slavish" 283people-more recent interpreters have instead portrayed the holistic Chinese 284worldview as a positive corrective to flaws that plague the alienated West.<sup>11</sup> 285Avoiding the pitfalls of reverse Orientalism allows us to see that the unique strengths 286of early Chinese thought are only visible against the background of basic human 287cognitive universals. We can resist overly exoticizing accounts of the role of 288metaphor in early China by recognizing that the self-conception of Western 289philosophy as being based upon abstract, literal reasoning is simply inaccurate, 290which means that the distinction between the "abstract West" and the "concrete East" 291is more one of self-conception than substance. Again, self conceptions do matter, but 292they should not blind us to the deeper affinities that function in the background of all 293human cognition, nor tempt us into the kind of cultural essentializing that can only 294impede our understanding of the role and function of metaphor in discourse and 295argumentation. 296

Some of the most recent work on the role of metaphor in early Chinese 297thought-much of it explicitly grounded in the cognitive linguistics literature-298has taken seriously the origin of metaphor in embodied human experience, 299thereby steering between the twin excesses of cultural essentialization and 300 intellectual imperialism.<sup>12</sup> While not relegating early Chinese discourse to some 301 ultimately alien and incommensurable thought-world, this work also avoids forcing 302 early Chinese discourse into the Procrustean bed of formal propositional logic, and 303 takes the metaphorical specificity of the original texts as significant in its own 304

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> A helpful historical survey of such views, which can be traced back to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and Marcel Granet, can be found in (Brown 2006); some representative recent expressions of this attitude from prominent scholars in, respectively, Europe and North America, can be found in the work of François Jullien (2007) or Roger Ames (2008).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> For more on "reverse Orientalism," as well as a thorough documentation of this trend in current sinological scholarship, the reader is referred to Slingerland (2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See, for instance, (Slingerland 2003) and (Slingerland 2004), Teng (2008), and (De Reu 2010). The work of Michael Puett on the concept of "innovation" (*zuo* (‡) (Puett 2001), Griet Vankeerberghen on the concept of *quan*  $\frac{1}{4}$  (Vankeerberghen 2005/2006), and that of Carine Defoort on metaphors of "light" and "heavy" in Mohist discourse (manuscript), can also be easily translated into a cognitive linguistics framework, although the authors themselves do not formally adopt this perspective. CHONG Kim-Chong has also written recently on the role of metaphor in early Chinese thought (Chong 2006, 2007), discussing the relative merits of alternate theoretical models, including that of cognitive linguistics, but ultimately embracing a Davidsonian view of metaphor as non-cognitive in nature.

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

right.<sup>13</sup> To my mind, one of the more significant symptoms of the strength of this 305 approach is the fact that some scholars who have previously expressed skepticism 306 about the value of the metaphor analysis approach have—without much fanfare— 307 begun analyzing Chinese philosophical texts from a perspective that appears to be 308 conceptual metaphor analysis in all but name, in that it centers on unpacking the 309 implications of particular foundational images rather than analyzing propositional 310 arguments.<sup>14</sup>

The power and promise of this cognitive metaphor approach center on two 312 features: its empirical plausibility and its hermeneutic productiveness. The approach 313 is empirically plausible because it draws upon and harmonizes with a massive 314 literature concerning the nature of human cognition that fundamentally calls into 315question, for instance, the traditional Western philosophical view. From a more 316 specifically sinological perspective, it also, I believe, produces much more satisfying 317 interpretations of texts and arguments, as well as links between various texts and 318 schools of thought. I will attempt to at least hint at both of these strengths in the case 319example below. 320

#### 2 The Cognitive Science of Meaning

Why do words mean anything? This is not only the central question for 322 contemporary Western philosophy of language, but perhaps also the most urgent 323question in modern analytic philosophy in general. The so-called "transduction 324 problem" (how perceptual signals could get "translated" into amodal symbols) and 325 the "grounding problem" (how arbitrary, abstract symbols could ever come to refer 326 to something in the world) are fundamental puzzles that present a challenge to the 327 modern Western philosophical representational model of knowledge, whereby 328 human thought involves an internal mind manipulating amodal symbols that 329 somehow hook up with things out there in the world. As Lawrence Barsalou has 330 observed, no one has ever provided a truly satisfactory answer to either of these 331 puzzles, and there is in fact absolutely no cognitive or neurological evidence that the 332 sort of abstract, amodal systems required by the representation model of knowledge 333 exist in the brain (Barsalou 1999: 580). The grounding problem also seems to be 334 fundamentally linked to a dualist model of perception whereby a disembodied mind, 335 separated from the world of physical things, is limited to dealing with mental 336representations that have, in some mysterious way, been "caused" by those otherwise 337 unknowable "things in themselves" (Putnam 1999: 102). 338

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Something like this shift is lauded in a recent piece in this journal by Eske Møllgaard, who observes that "when we immerse ourselves in the temporal structure of the text, then we begin to think through the figures of thought that actually appear in the text itself rather than through the standard vocabulary of modern philosophy" (Møllgaard 2005: 335). Møllgaard, however, seems in the end to follow commentators such as Bernard Faure in straying into a fetishization of "the particular" as a unique feature of East Asian thought.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See, for instance, Shun's analysis of "imageries" (Shun 2006: 195) related to the concept of purity in Chinese thought, or the discussion of the metaphor of xu  $\pm$  ("emptiness") in (Fraser 2008) that recapitulates many of the conclusions of (Slingerland 2003): 175-215.

Edward Slingerland

In response to these empirical and theoretical considerations, cognitive 339 scientists interested in the phenomenon of human perception have, in recent 340 decades, been moving away from representational models toward more 341embodied, "enactive" or "interactive" models. This enactive approach can be 342 traced back to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-343 Ponty, as well as American pragmatists such as John Dewey and William James, 344but re-appears in the modern psychology of perception in James Gibson's 345(Gibson 1979) concept of perception as the experience of the sensorimotor 346 "affordances" of objects in the environment-the possibilities of physical interaction that 347 objects spontaneously present to the embodied observer-as well as Ulric Neisser's 348 campaign for a more embodied and "ecologically valid" model of perception. 349 "Perception and cognition are usually not just operations in the head," Neisser argues, 350 "but transactions with the world" (Neisser 1976: 11). Perception is thus best understood 351not as a passive absorption of information, but "a kind of doing," a largely implicit 352 skill developed and refined as the embodied mind interacts with the world (Neisser 353 1976: 52). This "enacted perception" model of essential mind-body-world unity enjoys 354considerable empirical support, and is the basic working model in contemporary 355cognitive neuroscience.<sup>15</sup> 356

#### 2.1 Thought is Imagistic

One of the most fundamental challenges to the representational framework is the 358 growing consensus in various branches of the cognitive sciences that human thought 359is primarily image-based and modal in character-that is, deriving its structure from 360 sensory-motor patterns. Among cognitive scientists, this image-based view of human 361concepts has been perhaps most systematically developed by Lawrence Barsalou and 362 his colleagues, who argue for a "perceptual symbol" account of human cognition. 363 According to this model, the symbols manipulated in human thought are understood, 364 not as pictures, but as "records of neural activation that arises during perception" 365 (Barsalou 1999: 583). These records can be abstracted from and combined in various 366 ways in areas of the brain "upstream" from the sensory-motor cortices, but they 367 always remain to some extent grounded in sensory-motor systems. There is a huge 368 and constantly growing body of evidence in favor of at least some version of the 369 perceptual symbol account,<sup>16</sup> but perhaps the strongest argument in its favor is that it 370 avoids the two fundamental problems that plague amodal symbolic accounts 371 mentioned above: the transduction problem and the grounding problem. Barsalou 372 sums up the argument against classical Western amodal theories of meaning by 373 concluding that such theories "are unfalsifiable, they are not parsimonious, they lack 374direct support, they suffer conceptual problems such as transduction and symbol 375grounding, and it is not clear how to integrate them with theory in neighboring 376 fields, such as perception and neuroscience" (Barsalou 1999: 580). 377

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See (Berthoz 2000), (Gibbs 2006), and (Thompson 2007) for helpful surveys of the position and its empirical support.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> For reviews see the essays collected in Pecher and Zwaan (2005); another important recent statement of the argument for mental images as foundational for human cognition is (Kosslyn et al. 2006), which also includes a helpful review of the empirical evidence.

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

#### 2.2 The Role of Image Schemas in Abstract Thought

One central problem for the perceptual symbol account is that it is not vet entirely 379 clear how well it can handle abstract concepts. In his recent work, Barsalou has 380 argued that even the most abstract concepts are still fundamentally imagistic. 381understood perceptually by means of scene construction (see especially Barsalou et 382 al. 2003 and Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005). Drawing upon work that 383 suggests that words are normally and spontaneously understood against a situational 384background, Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings argue that even quite abstract words are 385 comprehended by activating images of relevant situations (Barsalou and Wiemer-386 Hastings 2005). On this account, both *hammer* and *truth* are comprehended by 387 means of concrete imagery; our sense that *truth* is more "abstract" derives from the 388 fact that its content is distributed across a multitude of situations and involves 389 complex events, introspective simulation of internal somato-sensory states, and 390 multiple modalities of perception.<sup>17</sup> 391

An alternate—and perhaps more promising—approach to grounding abstract 392 concepts is by means of conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending theory, which 393 argue that sensory-motor schemas are inevitably drawn upon when human beings 394 contemplate or attempt to reason about relatively abstract concepts.<sup>18</sup> Cognitive 395 linguists such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have made a strong case that 396 non-propositional, embodied "image schemas"<sup>19</sup> play a fundamental and inextrica-397 ble role in human cognition. These image schemas are recurring patterns arising 398 from our sensory-motor interactions with the world, similar to what Barsalou refers 399to as "perceptual simulations" (Barsalou 1999) and include such fundamental 400 structures as PATH, CONTAINMENT, PART-WHOLE, CONTACT, vertical SCALE, and the 401 recurrent CYCLE.<sup>20</sup> Image schemas give rise to "constrained inferences" or "entail-402 ments," a term that Johnson deliberately wishes to divorce from its more narrow 403 technical sense in analytic philosophy. For Johnson, the entailments of a given 404 schema include the "perceptions, discriminations, interests, values, beliefs, practices, 405and commitments" (Johnson 1987: 132) that are tied up with it. Johnson is here 406 inspired by the work of Gibsonian psychologists who argue that perceptions of 407 objects are unavoidably tied with "affordances"-plans of actions that perceived 408 objects inevitably present to the perceiver. As a plan for action, a schema is dynamic, 409possessing its own logic and sets of expectations. As an "irreducible gestalt" 410 (Johnson 1987: 44), a schema also cannot be translated into the sort of abstract, 411 algorithmic form that the objectivist model of knowledge would demand. Johnson's 412 argument in this regard is echoed by Barsalou's contention that the affordances 413 produced by perceptual simulations are fundamentally modal, and the resulting 414

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> For more on the abstract-concrete distinction, see (Wiemer-Hastings and Xu 2005).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> I will continue to refer to "relative" abstraction because, as I will touch upon at several points below, it is still something of an open question whether or not there exists in the brain any form of truly amodal representation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See (Johnson 2007: 144) and the essays collected in (Hampe 2005) for more on image "schemas" (the locution that has become standard to use in place of the more correct, but awkward, "schemata").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Many cognitive linguists have adopted the practice of referring to image schemas and cross-domain schema projects in small caps in order to remind readers that the word or words in question refer not to some amodal concept or proposition, but rather serve as a label for a bodily-based "complex web of connections in our experience and understanding" (Johnson 1987: 7).

Edward Slingerland

420

"inferences" could not be derived from a hypothetical amodal replacement (Barsalou4151999: 605). Drawing upon the entire sensorimotor state of the individual, image416schemas such as this also bring with them affective, normative components (Johnson4172007), which allows them to play a foundational role in argumentation and debate—a418theme to which I will return below.419

### 2.3 Conceptual Metaphor Theory

This idea of bodily-based, concrete schemas serving as conceptual templates for our 421 understanding of abstract, or less clearly-structured, domains is the basic insight 422 behind conceptual metaphor theory, which Johnson and Lakoff have done the most 423to develop. They were pioneers in formulating a comprehensive and coherent model 424of cross-domain projection and-most significantly-demonstrating the pervasiveness 425of these projections in all aspects of human conceptual life.<sup>21</sup> Against theories of 426 metaphor that portray it as a relatively rare and somewhat "deviant" mode of 427 communication thrown in to add rhetorical spice, Lakoff and Johnson argue that 428"conceptual metaphor" is in fact a ubiquitous and fundamental aspect of human 429cognition. Conceptual metaphor, as they understand it, involves the recruitment of 430structure from a concrete or clearly organized domain (the source domain) in order to 431 understand and talk about another, usually more abstract or less clearly structured, 432domain (the *target* domain). This is the basic conception of metaphor as a cross-433domain mapping introduced above, which encompasses similes and analogies as well 434as metaphors in the more traditional sense. 435

The most basic of these projective mappings are a set of "primary metaphors," 436 which are the result of relatively abstract target domains becoming associated with 437 some basic schema source domains-PATH or SCALE, for instance-through 438 experiential correlation. Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 50-54 provide a short list of 439representative primary metaphors such as AFFECTION IS WARMTH, IMPORTANT IS BIG, 440 MORE IS UP, etc., specifying their sensorimotor source domains and the primary 441 experience correlations that give rise to them. Although they argue that all such 442 primary metaphors develop gradually through experiential correlation, it is likely 443 that at least some basic cross-domain associations are the result of fixed synaesthetic 444 cross-wiring,<sup>22</sup> such as the correlation of tones with verticality, or textures such as 445sharpness with tones or tastes (a "E-sharp" or "sharp cheddar"). 446

However these primary metaphors are developed, all individuals have a huge 447 store of them at their disposal by the time they are able to become productive users 448 of language. These accumulated metaphorical associations then become one of the 449individual's primary tools for reasoning about him- or herself and the world-450especially when it comes to relatively abstract or unstructured domains—as well as 451for communicating thoughts to others. While concepts such as "time" or "death" 452may have a skeleton structure that is represented conceptually in relatively amodal 453terms, in most cases this amodal structure is not rich or detailed enough to allow us 454

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> (Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and 1999 and Gibbs 2006) provide helpful introductions to conceptual metaphor theory, and the current state of the field is tracked by the journals *Metaphor and Symbol* and *Cognitive Linguistics*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> For more on the relationship between synaesthesia—the unusual blending of two or more senses—and metaphor, see (Slingerland 2008b: 156-162).

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

to make useful inferences. Therefore, when we attempt to conceptualize and reason 455about relatively unstructured realms, this skeleton is fleshed out (usually automat-456ically and unconsciously) with additional structure provided by primary metaphors 457derived from basic bodily experience, often invoked in combination with other 458 primary metaphors to form complex metaphors or conceptual blends. When primary 459or complex source domains are activated in such cases and mapped onto the target 460domain, most aspects of the source domain conceptual topology-that is, inference 461 patterns, imagistic reasoning pattern, salient entities, etc.-are preserved, thereby 462 importing a high degree of structure into the target domain. 463

Image schemas and conceptual metaphors have been shown to play a 464 foundational structuring role in everything from basic human categorization and 465grammatical structures to religious and philosophical discourse, scientific theorizing, 466 and legal reasoning.<sup>23</sup> Simple documentation of the pervasiveness and systematicity 467 of conceptual metaphor in human cognition goes a long way toward demonstrating 468 that such schemas play more of a role than as mere figures of speech. In addition to 469the more general experimental evidence for the imagistic basis for concepts 470discussed above with regard to the perceptual symbol theory, there is also now a 471 veritable mountain of linguistic and psychological evidence for the claim that 472 conceptual metaphors in fact represent conceptually active, dynamic, language-473 independent structures that play an inevitable and fundamental role in embodied 474 human cognition.<sup>24</sup> To be sure, the empirical science of metaphor is still in its 475 infancy, and many outstanding problems remain, including how precisely metaphors 476are instantiated neurobiologically and how they interact with relatively abstract or 477 amodal propositions or conversational intentions. One may also, of course, question 478the details of specific metaphor analyses, or claims as to the extent to which 479particular metaphorical entailments are driving a given argument. What is 480 emphatically not in doubt, however, is that conceptual metaphors are cognitively 481 real-that is, metaphorical linguistic expressions do activate corresponding image 482 schemas in the sensory-motor regions of the brain-and that these activated schemas 483play an important role in perception, semantic and syntactic processing, and at least 484certain sorts of reasoning processes.<sup>25</sup> 485

#### 2.4 Blending Theory

Conceptual blending theory, originally developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark 487 Turner, encompasses conceptual metaphor theory, but goes beyond it to argue that 488 *all* of human cognition—even literal and logical thought—involves the creation of 489

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> See (Slingerland 2008a: 170-172) for extensive references.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> For reviews of various convergent lines of linguistic and experimental evidence, see (McNeill 1992), (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 81-89), (Coulson 2001: 75-83), Rohrer 2005, and Gibbs 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> There continue to be scholars—typically those working from an analytical philosophy background who dismiss conceptual metaphors as trivial verbal parallelism, or as cognitively-empty, attention-getting devices. For instance, Chris Fraser characterizes as "preposterous" and "a huge philosophical blunder" the idea that human beings sometimes draw upon image schemas such as object manipulation to understand the phenomenology of agency, and dismisses proposed universal conceptual metaphors as nothing more than superficial syntactic parallels that happen to co-appear in American English (Fraser 2007: 105-106). Such dogmatic philosophical harrumphing is a poor substitute for actual engagement with the relevant empirical evidence.

mental spaces and mappings between them. In this way, it serves as a kind of unified 490 theory identifying conceptual metaphor as merely one particularly dramatic 491 cognitive process (a single- or multiple-scope blend) among many more pedestrian 492 processes, such as categorization, semantic frame construction, and naming. It also 493 goes beyond linguistic production to describe the manner in which novel motor 494 programs, technological interfaces, and social institutions are created through a 495 process of space blending.<sup>26</sup>

The basic unit of blending theory is the so-called "mental space," consisting of a 497"set of activated neuronal assemblies" (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 40) that form a 498coherent structure, often "marked" in some way-as a "past" space or "purported 499belief" space—and potentially nested inside other spaces. Unlike the sort of 500entrenched cross-domain mappings that are represented by primary conceptual 501metaphors and stored in long-term memory, mental spaces are temporary, 502schematically-structured mental spaces prompted by language or other signals. Built 503 up in working memory as we think or talk, they draw upon more stable knowledge 504and images called up from long-term memory, but then are able to combine, blend, 505extend, and reframe these domains in quite unexpected and creative ways—often by 506systematically connecting elements in one space to elements in another space 507through neural coactivation-bindings. 508

One of the primary ways in which blending theory emends conceptual metaphor 509theory is by showing that many expressions that, at first glance, seem to involve 510simple source-to-target-domain mappings in fact involve the blending of two or 511more spaces into a novel conceptual structure. A simple source to target domain 512mapping is understood in blending theory as a "single-scope" blend, where two 513input spaces (Input<sub>1</sub> and Input<sub>2</sub>) project into a third, "blended" space, but all of the 514relevant structure comes from only one of the inputs. In such blends, Input<sub>1</sub> 515corresponds to conceptual metaphor's "source" domain, and Input<sub>2</sub> corresponds to 516the "target." The power of seeing this process as a projection of two domains into a 517third, temporary, "blended" space is that it allows us to deal with situations where 518structure is coming from more than one input domain, resulting in a novel blend, 519with its own emergent structure, that is identical to neither of the inputs. Single-520scope blends—accurately represented by simple source to target domain mappings— 521remain constrained by the input or source domain: structure is projected to a new 522domain, but no new structure is created. True human creativity would seem to 523require selective and novel recombination of conceptual units, and blending theory 524provides us with a general model for how we might represent and trace this sort of 525selective recruitment and combination of pre-given schemas into novel conceptual 526structures. These novel conceptual structures, in turn, can then serve as inputs to a 527 further blend, which allows us to model the discrete steps of what I have called 528"ratcheted innovation": novel blends becoming entrenched in the culturally-529transformed environment by means of language or physical artifacts, and then 530giving rise to additional blends a further step removed from the original input spaces. 531

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Space considerations prevent anything like a thorough introduction to this field. For recent introductions to blending theory, see Coulson (2001) and Fauconnier and Turner (2002); for a comparison with conceptual metaphor theory, see (Grady et al. 1999); and for a very short introduction with some illustrative examples and a helpful bibliography, see (Dancygier 2006).

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

Metaphorical blending analysis thus allows us to trace with precision how hybrid 532cultural-biological environments are built, how they are experienced and integrated 533by the developing body-mind, and how they are recruited to structure abstract 534thought. Whereas early versions of conceptual metaphor theory tended to focus 535exclusively on the individual body and the generic physical environment, blending 536theory allows us to take into account the extent that, for human beings, the physical 537environment is pervaded with cultural information that can transform basic 538perceptual schemas and give rise to quite novel and idiosyncratic concepts.<sup>27</sup> 539

I will return to blending theory in the example from the *Mencius* presented below, 540 but first must discuss a final relevant topic of inquiry in recent cognitive science 541 research: the foundational role of bodily-based emotions—inextricably linked with 542 the images with which we think—in human reasoning. 543

#### 2.5 Emotions and Reason

The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has been arguing for decades that emotionally-545derived and often unconscious feelings of "goodness" or "badness" play a crucial 546role in everyday decision-making. Damasio notes that an important feature of human 547memory is that "when we recall an object...we retrieve not just sensory data but also 548accompanying motor and emotional data" (Damasio 1999: 161), which means that 549"virtually every image, actually perceived or recalled, is accompanied by some 550reaction from the apparatus of emotion" (Damasio 1999: 58). If concepts are 551imagistic, this means that our entire conceptual life is pervaded, through and 552through, by such "somatic markers." Damasio argues that somatic markers play a 553crucial role in human reasoning and decision-making by, in any given situation, 554selectively drawing our attention to a limited number of strongly-marked concepts or 555potential outcomes. This model contrasts sharply with what Damasio refers to as the 556Enlightenment "high-reason" view of decision-making, whereby the individual 557considers all of the options open to her, performs a cost-benefit analysis of each 558option.<sup>28</sup> and then coolly chooses the rationally optimal option. Damasio argues that 559the high-reason model is implausible simply because there are so many options 560theoretically available at any given moment, and the human mind is not capable of 561running simultaneous analyses of all of the theoretically possible course of action. 562Therefore, the body contributes by biasing the reasoning process—usually 563unconsciously-before it even begins by radically reducing the focus of attention 564to a few emotionally salient objects. "There is still room for using a cost/benefit 565analysis and proper deductive competence," Damasio notes, "but only after the 566automated step drastically reduces the number of options. Somatic markers may not 567 be sufficient for normal human decision-making, since a subsequent process of 568reasoning and final selection will still take place in many though not all instances. 569

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> See (Gibbs 1999, Kimmel 2005, and Slingerland 2008b: 206-218) for more on this topic.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Damasio conflates the two primary forms of Enlightenment ethical and practical reasoning—utilitarian cost/benefit analysis and deontological reasoning—and therefore incorrectly attributes utilitarian views to Kant (see, for instance, Damasio 1994: 173–174). This does not affect the validity of his point, however, and we might simply add "analysis in terms of deontological principles" to his mentions of cost/benefit analysis.

Somatic markers probably increase the accuracy and efficiency of the decision 570 process. Their absence reduces them" (Damasio 1994: 173). 571

This point is vividly demonstrated by cases described by Damasio where damage 572to the prefrontal cortex, a center of emotion processing in the brain, severely impairs 573 an individual's ability to make what most people would consider "rational" 574decisions. Although the short- and long-term memories and abstract reasoning and 575mathematical skills of these patients were unimpaired, in real-life decision-making 576contexts they were appallingly inept, apparently incapable of efficiently choosing 577 between alternate courses of action, taking into account the future consequences of 578their actions, or accurately prioritizing the relative importance of potential courses of 579action. Interestingly, when their decision-making processes are examined closely, 580these patients appear to approach something like the "high reason" ideal: deprived of 581the biasing function of somatic markers, they seem to attempt to dispassionately 582consider all of the options theoretically open to them, with the result that they 583become paralyzed by indecision, fritter away their time on unimportant tasks, or 584simply commit themselves to what appear to outside observers as poorly considered 585and capriciously selected courses of action. Revealingly, despite his almost complete 586real-life incompetence, the patient referred to as "Elliot" scored quite well on the 587 Standard Issue Moral Judgment Interview-developed by the Kantian moral 588psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, which measures a person's ability to abstractly 589reason their way through moral dilemmas and other theoretical problems. This 590theoretical ability to reason about dilemmas did not, however, translate into an 591ability to make actual reasonable decisions: "at the end of one session, after he had 592produced an abundant quantity of options for action, all of which were valid and 593implementable, Elliot smiled, apparently satisfied with his rich imagination, but 594added, 'And after all this, I still wouldn't know what to do!'" (Damasio 1994: 49). 595Damasio postulates that this statement, as well as Elliot's inability to make effective 596decisions in real-life situations, can be attributed to the fact that "the cold-597 bloodedness of Elliot's reasoning prevented him from assigning different values to 598different options, and made his decision-making landscape hopelessly flat" 599(Damasio 1994: 51). 600

Combining metaphor and blending theory with Damasio's insights concerning 601 somatic marking, we could say that the primary function of creating a metaphor or 602 blend is to harness emotions produced by "basic-level" scenarios and recruit them in 603 order to facilitate or influence the direction of decision-making in more complex or 604 abstract scenarios. The manner in which this is accomplished is the projection of 605somatic images, along with their accompanying somatic markers. Damasio's work 606 constitutes one part of an increasing accumulation of evidence concerning the 607 foundational role of emotions in human reasoning and decision-making, evidence 608 that has begun pushing psychologically-knowledgeable philosophers and 609 philosophically-knowledgeable psychologists toward a position that would please 610 Hume or Nietzsche: that both ethical reasoning and ethical decision-making are 611 grounded in emotional biasing and "gut reactions" (Prinz 2006).<sup>29</sup> Significantly, the 612

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> For philosophical work on the importance of emotion and imagery see also (Johnson 1993, De Sousa 1987, Nussbaum 2001), and Prinz 2007, as well as the essays collected in (Rorty 1980 and Solomon 2004).

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

role being played by emotions is often inaccessible to-or actively covered up by-613 our conscious, verbal minds. A large body of experimental work on moral 614 "confabulation" has demonstrated that ethical judgments that can be clearly 615demonstrated to have emotional causes are quickly and effortlessly "spun" by our 616 conscious minds into rational justifications, which then serves to obscure their 617 visceral origins.<sup>30</sup> Uncovering these origins, and thereby recognizing the role of 618 emotionally-charged, behavior-guiding, embodied and often unconscious images as 619 foundational for human cognition both serves as an important corrective to the 620 Enlightenment ideal of disembodied reason and helps us to see the common ground 621 between early Chinese and modern Western styles of argumentation.<sup>31</sup> 622

The addition of Damasio's somatic marker theory highlights a feature of blends 623 that is not always emphasized: they are not simply normatively neutral devices for 624 accurately apprehending situations, but are in fact often created and communicated 625 in order to advance particular normative agendas, which they accomplish through 626 the stimulation of predictable visceral reactions. In other words, metaphors and 627 metaphoric blends are not normatively neutral mechanisms for understanding the 628 world-or expressing some sort of timeless harmony between nature and man-but 629 rather polemical devices aimed at driving home a particular normative view. This 630 emotive-normative function has been somewhat overlooked in most previous 631 discussions of blending: blends do guide reasoning, often in very particular 632 directions chosen by the creators of the blend, but often by means of inspiring 633 normativity-bestowing emotional reactions. This is why blending is arguably the 634 primary tool in political and religious-moral debate, where human scale inputs are 635 recruited polemically in order to inspire somatic-emotional normative reactions in 636 the listeners.<sup>32</sup> Acceptance of the validity of such blends inevitably commits the 637 listener to a certain course of action (or, at least, a potential course of action), and 638 this effect can be reliably predicted by the blend author on the basis of both cultural 639 knowledge and the relatively fixed nature of human emotional-somatic reactions. 640

### 3 Metaphorical Blending and Argumentation in Early China: A Case Example 641

One of the several great advantages that blending analysis possesses compared to conceptual metaphor analysis is that it allows us to trace the construction of complex blended spaces that are built up over the course of a discourse or conversation. Following this process of blend creation "on the fly," as it were, gives us a sense of how the recruitment of normativity is a dynamic affair, involving not merely the selection of appropriate input spaces, but also the creative and finely-targeted 647

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> For reviews of this literature see (Haidt 2001 and Greene and Haidt 2002).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> As mentioned above, (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) have documented in some detail the manner in which the thought of philosophers in the Western tradition, from Plato to Frege, is fundamentally predicated upon metaphorical thinking. (Lakoff and Núñez 2000) have similarly demonstrated how the field of mathematics—presumably the abstract science *par excellence*—is also fundamentally structured by image schematic reasoning, a position corroborated by recent experimental and neuroimaging work (see Kadosh and Walsh 2009 and the accompanying peer commentary).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Nothing less than a small cottage industry has sprung up around the analysis of conceptual metaphors and blends in political reasoning and debate; see Slingerland et al. (2007) for a review.

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invocation of "counter-inputs" in response to blends created by an argumentative 648 opponent. Although input spaces (the equivalent of "image schemas" in conceptual 649 metaphor terminology) have a certain pre-given structure of their own-derived 650 from embodied experience and cultural knowledge-precisely how and what they 651 project onto the blended space very much depends upon the argumentative context. 652 which in turn is often embedded in a broader conversational or theoretical 653 framework. Precisely how the various influences of input spaces, the growing 654blend, and the argumentative intentions of the blend author are negotiated is one of 655 the major outstanding problems in blending theory, but the flow of information is 656 clearly going in more than one direction. 657

This deals with the common criticism of conceptual metaphor analysis that it 658 forces metaphors to carry too much of the burden, as it were: metaphors in and of 659 themselves are not arguments, because their intended meaning depends very much 660 upon how they are being used and to what end.<sup>33</sup> An important early critique of 661 conceptual metaphor theory by Naomi Quinn (Quinn 1991), for instance, argues that 662 Lakoff and Johnson see too much structure emerging automatically and necessarily 663 from a given image schema, failing to notice the degree to which preexisting cultural 664 models and argumentative intentions determine which metaphors are invoked, and 665 which specific entailments of a given metaphor are deemed relevant. People often, 666 she observes, have a clear sense in their minds—one derived from specific cultural 667 beliefs or strategic social goals-about what entailments they are looking for, and 668 only then go in search of a metaphor that will provide them with these entailments. 669 As studies of the use of metaphor in political debate make clear, speakers often have 670 a pre-determined conceptual or emotional point that they desire to make, and then 671 choose metaphors that are designed to communicate this point to others. One of the 672 strengths of blending theory is that it provides us with a way to model this flexible 673 use of image schemas, displaying how which inputs from a given space are deemed 674 "relevant" very much depends on pre-existing blend structure or argumentative 675 intention, and illustrating how cultural and theoretical assumptions can work in the 676 background as unverbalized structuring elements. 677

3.1 An Early Chinese Case Example: Mencius 6A1-2

I would like to give a sense of how blending theory, enhanced by somatic marker 679 theory as described above, might be used to analyze early Chinese argumentation by 680 looking very briefly at the exchange between Mencius and Gaozi that opens Book 681 Six of the *Mencius*.<sup>34</sup> Some commentators on this debate have famously dismissed it 682 as "a mass of irrelevant analogies" (Waley 1939: 194) or as an "atrociously inept and 683 unconvincing" bit of argumentation (Hansen 1992: 188). Here I would like to 684 illustrate how the debate is neither illogical nor algorithmically logical in the manner 685

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> For example, although they typically exaggerate the extent to which I argue that "the metaphor is the argument," some critics of my work on conceptual metaphor theory in Warring States thought (Slingerland 2003) make the important observation that any given metaphor schema could be used to make very different argumentative points, depending on how it is being used and the deeper theoretical assumptions of the user (e.g., Cline 2003: 456, Cline 2008; Chong 2006: 234-5, 245).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Much of the blending analysis below is drawn from Slingerland 2007.

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

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required by analytic philosophy, but rather fundamentally predicated on metaphoric 686 blends linked to embodied emotional reactions.<sup>35</sup> 687

The first of these two passages begins with Gaozi's opening claim that "Human 688 nature is like the qi willow. Morality is like cups and bowls. To make morality out of 689 human nature is like making cups and bowls out of the willow tree." This statement 690 sets up a double-scope blend that can be mapped as in Fig. 1 below: 691

Here, human beings' innate tendencies are portrayed as a raw material that is 692 fundamentally re-shaped by some external "tool," the precise nature of which 693 depends on who we understand Gaozi to be.<sup>36</sup> In any case, though, the result is 694 portrayed as a beautiful artifact bearing little resemblance to the original, crude 695 material, with the shape this artifact is determined by the tool. While most of the 696 structure of this blend is imported from the CRAFT PRODUCTION space, it is double-697 scope because one important aspect of the causality (indicated by the dashed line) is 698 derived from the MORAL EDUCATION space: although in craft production it is the 699 artisan who determines the shape of the product (wielding the tool in accordance 700 with his or her design), the behavior-determining importance of the doctrine of 701 impartial caring or training in traditional cultural forms prevails in the blend, 702 resulting in a situation where it is the tool, rather than the artisan, that determines the 703 shape of the "moral artifact." Gaozi's primary purpose in constructing this blend is 704 to get his listener to take the positive feelings that one has toward beautiful, finely 705 carved artifacts—as well as the corresponding negative feelings toward crude, 706 unshaped raw material-and project these onto the project of neo-Mohist or 707 externalist Confucian moral education. The inborn human feeling of partial love for 708 one's parents is ugly and crude, whereas the desired cultivated behavior is beautiful 709 and refined. 710

Mencius's response is as follows:

Can you follow (lit. "flow with") the nature of the willow in making your cups713and bowls? Or is it in fact the case that you will have to mutilate<sup>37</sup> the willow714before you can make it into cups and bowls? If you have to mutilate the willow715to make it into cups and bowls, must you then also mutilate people to make716them moral? Misleading the people of the world into bringing disaster upon717morality—surely this describes the effects of your doctrine!718

This is a wonderful example of conceptual blending *jujitsu*: Mencius takes720Gaozi's blend and then sets up two new spaces to counteract it, that of LIVING THINGS721and WATER. We can map this modified blend as in Fig. 2 below:722

The introduction of these two new spaces has a dramatic effect upon the blend. 723 The LIVING THING space as Mencius constructs it maps quite nicely onto the CRAFT 724


**O3** 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> For a related argument against seeing Mencian argumentation as either "top-down," algorithmic reasoning or simply irrational, see (Wong 2002).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Until recently, many scholars have assumed that Gaozi was a "neo-Mohist," in which case the "tool" is likely to be the doctrine of impartial caring, and the desired product a settled determination to practice impartial caring (the construal assumed above and mapped in Fig. 1). In light of the recent Guodian finds, others have suggested that the Gaozi in the *Mencius* may, in fact, be a fellow Confucian, albeit one with a more externalist conception of how one develops a sense of "rightness" (yi 3) than Mencius himself (Goldin 1999; Scarpari 2001; Slingerland 2008a). In this latter case, the "tool" would be something like training in ritual, music, and the classics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Qiang'zei; lit. to "steal" or "rob" the nature of willow tree.

Edward Slingerland



PRODUCTION space, but in an entirely *disanalogous* fashion (represented by the large 725 arrows). The shapeless raw material is now compared to a living thing with an innate 726 *telos*, which, in turn, transforms the skillful artisan of Gaozi's blend into a cruel 727 mutilator, his useful tool into a harmful weapon, and the process of carving into an 728 act of unnatural deformation. Mencius is no doubt counting upon the negative 729 visceral reactions inspired by these images of cutting into a living being, causing it 730 pain, and inflicting mutilation. In this way, he very effectively subverts Gaozi's 731




Fig. 2 Mencius 6A1 (Mencius' response)

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

blend by transforming the original projections from the CRAFT PRODUCTION to the 732 Blend space (dashed lines) into normatively strongly negative ones: the product of 733 an externalist process of education is now portrayed as a tortured moral cripple 734 rather than a skillfully-formed artifact. For good measure, he adds the WATER space 735 to the blend, which both reinforces the negative connotations of going against the 736 natural "flow" and sets up the transition to 6A2. 737

Mencius 6A2 finds Gaozi picking up on Mencius's water imagery and attempting 738 to turn it to his own rhetorical advantage, switching to the domain of irrigation 739 management to make his point: "Human nature is like a whirlpool. Cut a channel to 740 the east and it will flow east; cut a channel to the west and will flow west. The lack 741 of a tendency toward good or bad in human nature is just like water's lack of a 742 preference for east or west." If we assume the entrenched metaphor, TYPE OF 743 BEHAVIOR AS DIRECTION, Gaozi's statement here can be mapped as a rather 744straightforward single-scope blend, as in Fig. 3: 745

With his craft metaphor of 6A1 foiled by Mencius'introduction of the LIVING 746 THING and WATER spaces, Gaozi attempts to make his point by switching to a 747 different domain, that of WATER MANAGEMENT. The normative point here is also the 748 same as in 6A1: just as crude raw material needs to be shaped by a craftsman in 749 order to become beautiful, directionless whirling water in an irrigation pond needs to 750 be directed by a wise manager if it is to be brought to the proper place. 751

The fact that the book is called the *Mencius*, and not the *Gaozi*, should prepare us 752 to see Gaozi's efforts to turn the rhetorical tables on Mencius be thwarted. As in 753 6A1, Mencius responds by subverting Gaozi's metaphor: 754

Water certainly does not distinguish between East and West, but does it fail to<br/>distinguish between up and down? The goodness of human nature is like the<br/>downhill movement of water—there is no person who is not good, just as there<br/>is no water that does not flow downward.756759759




Fig. 3 Mencius 6A2 (Gaozi's position)

**Q3** 

Edward Slingerland

790

Now, as for water, if you strike it with your hand and cause it to splash up, you760can make it go above your forehead; if you apply force and pump it, you can762make it go uphill. Is this really the nature of water, though? No, it is merely the763result of environmental influences. That a person can be made bad shows that764his nature can also be altered like this.765

Here Mencius subverts Gaozi's blend not by adding new spaces, but by mapping767elements of an existing input that Gaozi "missed": water certainly has no preference768for East or West, but it certainly has a natural preference for traveling downhill. We769can map Mencius's response as in Fig. 4 below<sup>38</sup>:770

Mencius's response here nicely shows how deciding the relevant features of an 771 input is a very arguable process-focusing on new elements can give an entirely 772 different quality to the blend.<sup>39</sup> Instead of focusing on a whirling pool's potential to 773 be channeled in whatever direction is determined by the irrigation manager, Mencius 774 uses the WATER space to introduce teleological and normatively charged features: the 775 natural, "internal" tendency of water is to flow downhill, and to go against this 776 tendency requires the application of external force. Although it is possible under 777 certain circumstances to make water flow uphill, this requires a huge expenditure of 778 force and is ultimately unsustainable—going "against the flow" of Nature-Heaven is 779 bound to lead to failure. This image is reinforced by another passage later in the 780book, 6B11, where Mencius extols the achievements of the great sage-king Yu, who 781tamed the Yellow River and made China habitable by wisely following the 782 tendencies of nature—gently guiding the rivers into new channels and helping them 783 along to the sea-as opposed to the evil and stupid flood-control managers of 784 Mencius's own day, who go "against the flow," attempting to crudely block and 785 radically re-direct the natural flows of China's rivers and thus bringing disaster to 786 everyone. The harm caused by Yu's counterparts in Mencius's age is analogous to 787 the injury caused by the externalists and their educational strategy that fails to "flow 788 along with" human nature. 789


### 3.2 Blending Theory and Textual Analysis

After presenting the above analysis of the Mencius-Gaozi debate to one of my791sinological colleagues, she observed that, in her opinion, the same conclusions about792the structure and meaning of the exchange could be reached by simpler, and more793traditional, textual analysis tools, and wondered what end was served by the crazy794diagrams and convoluted theoretical framework. I agreed that most of the insights795

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> This mapping is simplified by not including the entrenched CONTAINER and ESSENCE metaphors, triggered by the mention of "environmental influences" whereby external, environmental causes are understood as "unnatural" and natural behavior (behavior in accordance with the ESSENCE) is the result of inner causality.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Sarah Allan argues that Mencius "wins" the debate against Gaozi because he "had a better understanding of water than Gaozi," and because he "truly understood water" (1997: 42). This is accurate if intended as a characterization of the intended *effect* of the blend, but as a meta-analysis it seems to miss the point. It is hard to understand what it would mean to grasp "the true nature of water"—it is equally true that water flows downhill *and* that it has no preference for direction when it comes to a horizontal plane. Getting us to see the particular feature of water that he focuses upon as more "true" or relevant is simply Mencius' rhetorical strategy.

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China



about this particular debate could potentially be reached without the long and 796 technical detour, in the same way that, say, perceptive and intelligent medieval 797 astronomers could often figure out important aspects of the movements of the 798 celestial bodies in an unsystematic, ad hoc manner. This does not mean, however, 799 that developing a modern, systematic science of astrophysics does not represent 800 something of an advance, in that it actually uncovers the underlying mechanisms at play, and thereby makes attaining accurate insights a bit less of a hit-or-miss process. 802

My colleague rather naturally took exception to being compared to a medieval 803 astronomer, and perhaps that analogy was not the best. A more helpful one might be 804 the contrast between someone who learned to read classical Chinese in something 805 like the traditional manner—that is, immersed in a large quantity of text, building up 806 a sense of the language in the same way one learns one's native tongue—as opposed 807 to someone who combines such training with a knowledge of the grammar of 808 classical Chinese. Most of the time an informal, intuitive sort of knowledge will be 809 enough to accurately make sense of a given passage. There are times, however-810 when confronted with a particularly opaque sentence, for instance, or commentarial 811 controversy over the meaning of a passage-when a formal knowledge of the 812 underlying grammar is invaluable. 813

The underlying point of both analogies is the same. There is a very good 814 possibility that conceptual blending theory, yoked to something like Damasio's 815 theory of somatic marking, provides us with a relatively accurate model of "the way 816 we think," to borrow the title of Fauconnier and Turner 2002. At the very least, it has 817 the advantage of being neurologically plausible and being backed by a fairly 818 impressive, and growing, body of empirical evidence-unlike the models of human 819 cognition that inform, consciously or not, much of the work in our field. Although 820 mobilizing such a massive theoretical machinery to explain a relatively short and 821 straightforward rhetorical exchange may strike one as a case of "using an ox cleaver 822 to kill a chicken," as Analects 17.4 puts it, we must not lose sight of the fact that ox 823

837

cleavers are sometimes necessary and useful. Elsewhere I have used this cleaver to 824 try to reveal at least some of the deeper structures of sections of Mencius 2A2 825 (Slingerland 2008a: 196-206), and I feel that systematically mapping out the central 826**01** blends at work in this text-a massive ox if ever there were one-requires more 827 complicated tools than those traditionally available to sinologists. More importantly, 828 whether one feels that the specific tool of the blending diagram or talk of somatic 829 markers is hermeneutically useful or not, there is a deeper purpose to this exercise. 830 First of all, I think that it is important to debunk the sorts of exoticizing theories 831 about metaphor and analogy as uniquely Chinese modes of discourse that are still 832 quite popular in our field. Secondly, it is equally important to call into question the 833 modern Western conceit that philosophical or scientific discourse functions on an 834 entirely abstract, propositional level. I am content if I have made progress toward at 835 least these two goals. 836

### 4 Human Reasoning and Argumentation

Like economic systems, intellectual trends have a tendency to overcompensate, with 838 corrective movements often shooting past the proper mean to new extremes in the 839 other direction. The mere fact that I can make an extended argument to you, the 840 reader, in relatively-though not completely-abstract language, and expect my 841 argument to be weighed on its intellectual content and the merits of the evidence 842 marshaled, serves to remind us that human beings are capable of constructing and 843 processing (mostly) abstract, rational arguments. Recent insights concerning the 844 imagistic and emotionally-bound nature of human cognition have too often tended to 845 obscure the fact that humans have not only clearly evolved systems that work at 846 rather high levels of abstraction, but-especially with proper training-can rely on 847 these systems to counterbalance the fast and automatic judgments of lower-level 848 systems. Many of today's most vociferous critics of the image-based model of 849 human cognition that I have presented above are motivated by a desire to not see the 850 baby thrown out with the bathwater: the fact that much of the Western philosophical 851 tradition has had an exaggerated view of the abstract and rational nature of our 852 reasoning and argumentation processes does not mean that such capacities do not 853 exist at all.<sup>40</sup> In fact, considering how physiologically costly and excruciatingly slow 854 such capacities are, they must have had a considerable evolutionary payoff for our 855 ancestors to have developed at all. 856

It is nonetheless the case that, of the several sentences that I just wrote above, 857 most of the cognitive heavy lifting, as it were, is being done by such apparently 858 abstract, but in fact thoroughly embodied and visceral, image schemas as *extremes*, 859 *balance*, *shooting past, counterbalance*; *insight* and *obscuration*; *costs* and *payoffs*; 860 and of course—and probably the only one we consciously register as a metaphor— 861 *babies* and *bathwater*. If the model of human cognition emerging from cognitive 862 science that I have presented above is even remotely correct, then argumentation— 863

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> The replies and responses accompanying (Barsalou 1999 and Pylyshyn 2003) provide a helpful entrée into the debate concerning imagistic versus amodal reasoning.

Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

especially in heated, real-life situations, rather than the cool, abstracted context of 866 contemporary academia—should be seen as centrally, if not primarily, focused on 867 winning the battle to metaphorically frame the situation, and thus sway the emotions 868 of one's conversational partners.<sup>41</sup> Getting beyond the conceit of many Western 869 philosophers that they are engaged in the purely rational, completely abstract process 870 of reasoning and argumentation allows us to see that classic Enlightenment thinkers 871 such as Kant were engaged in a project substantially identical to that of Mencius in 872 his debates with Gaozi: drawing upon emotionally-laden images to urge his readers 873 to favor a particular model of morality above another. In fact, looking at Kant's 874 writings in this light reveals how his arguments in favor of his deontological vision 875 skillfully entwine emotions such as "reverence" or a sense of "dignity" and "awe" 876 with his particular approach to ethics, and are fundamentally predicated on such 877 viscerally normative dichotomies as "higher" vs. "lower," "autonomous" and "free" 878 vs. "passive" or "servile," "pure" vs. "contaminated," and "proper" vs. "alien."<sup>42</sup> 879

The role of less-than-rational forces in philosophical argumentation has, of 880 course, long been argued by post-Enlightenment philosophers such as Nietzsche. 881 Having Kant and his followers in mind, Nietzsche observes: 882

They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through883the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic...while at883bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of "inspiration"—most886often the desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract—that they887defend with reasons they have sought after the fact. They are all advocates who888resent that name...wily spokesmen for prejudices which they baptize "truths"889(Nietzsche 1886/1966: 12).890

This Nietzschean critique has more recently been picked up by modern moral 892 psychologists such as Joshua Greene, who draws upon some of the work on 893 emotions, automaticity, and lack of central cognitive control mentioned above to 894 argue that "deontological philosophy, rather than being grounded in moral 895 *reasoning*, is to a large extent an exercise in moral *rationalization*" (Greene 2007: 896 36). The same, arguably, can also be said of other "high-reason" based models of 897 ethics, such as consequentialism.<sup>43</sup> What has changed since the 19<sup>th</sup> century is that 898

 $<sup>^{\</sup>overline{41}}$  I thus find rather bizarre Jean-Paul Reding's comment, in his discussion of the Mencius-Gaozi debate examined above, that "the specific technique of combating a proposed metaphor with a (better) countermetaphor seems to be unknown in the West" (2004: 138). One needs only to open a newspaper and consider a typical debate about whether U.S. troops in Afghanistan are "trapped in a quagmire" (or "another Vietnam") or "about to tip the balance of power" between the government and insurgents, to dismiss this claim.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Consider, for example, Kant's indignant rejection of the "slack, or indeed ignoble, attitude which seeks for the moral principles among empirical motives or laws," as well as his claim that the purity of moral philosophy depends upon it being "the authoress of her own laws" rather than "the mouthpiece of laws whispered to her by some implanted sense or by who knows what tutelary nature" (Kant 1785/1964: 93). These lines are explicitly designed to conjure up in Kant's readers a visceral disdain for "slack" and "ignoble" persons, as well, perhaps, as the horrors of the snake whispering alien and evil counsels into Eve's passive ear.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> It should be noted that Greene himself disagrees with this claim, arguing that consequentialism is, in fact, more "cognitive"—emotionally neutral—and "more likely to involve genuine moral reasoning" (Greene: 36). To my mind, this obscures not only the degree to which the "costs" and "benefits" involved in a consequentialist calculation are metaphoric entities, endowed with either negative or positive valences that emerge from emotional biasing, but also the degree to which the process of calculation is itself a metaphoric process.

we now have a tremendous, and constantly growing, body of evidence suggesting 899 that Nietzsche was right—not merely about the irrational "germs" of great 900 philosophical systems, but many other things as well, such as the importance of 901 metaphor for human thought or the de-centered nature of the self. 902

#### **5** Conclusion

903

I assign the portions of the Mencius discussed above (in English translation, of 904 course) to students in my undergraduate survey course on Warring States thought, 905 and they all find it a powerful and amusing piece of discourse, coming away 906 convinced that Gaozi and his followers were misguided or foolish and confident in 907 the wisdom of the Mencian approach to self-cultivation. The commonality of this 908 sort of phenomenon-an ancient text from a completely alien culture speaking to a 909 modern person with a clear and powerful voice-is similar to the ease with which 910 we reach out and grasp a moving object, or gauge the emotions of a person with 911 whom we are speaking and adjust our tone and body language accordingly: 912effortlessness in all these cases obscures the staggering complexity of the actual 913 processes involved. 914

Of course modern Canadian college students react predictably to the image of 915someone foolishly trying to oppose the inexorable downward flow of water. This 916 sense of cognitive transparency makes it easy for us to overlook how astounding it is 917 that a text assembled in archaic Chinese in the 4th century B.C.E. by some wizened 918 Confucian scholars could survive the millennia, be translated into modern English, 919 and trigger the construction of spaces in the minds of 21st century C.E., baggy-920 pants-clad, text-messaging, facebooking Canadian college students in a manner 921 entirely predictable to its original author. Of course, I may in fact have misconstrued 922 some of these passages in a variety of ways: perhaps I am mistaken about the 923 "whirling pool" in 6A2 having to do with irrigation management (this is not the 924 standard take on it), or I may be ignorant of some important, relevant features of 925 early Chinese irrigation management that in turn has led to a misunderstanding of 926 Mencius's position. It is equally possible that I have missed or improperly 927 interpreted some of the entailments of the metaphors invoked, similarly resulting 928 in misfiring of the intended blend construction. This sort of miscommunication is not 929 uncommon with texts from another culture or time-the primary job of linguists and 930 historians being to help prevent us from making such mistakes. For the most part, 931however, we move through our world with consummate ease, and the meaning of the 932 vast majority of even quite culturally alien texts such as the *Mencius* is entirely and 933 immediately transparent to people provided with a decent translation. 934

Occasional failures in comprehension and performance are merely superficial and 935 obvious exceptions that prove the deeply buried rule: human bodies (including the 936 brain part) are built to do certain things, and to do them largely unconsciously and 937 quite well. The fact that the blends constructed by the author of the Mencius are 938 re-created by our own brains as we read the translated text supports the argument of 939 cognitive linguists that thought is triggered and communicated by language, but not 940 constituted by it. Moreover, the fact that even the specifics of most of the mappings 941 considered-including the somatic-emotional reactions they are intended to trigger-942 Metaphor and Meaning in Early China

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are very similar cross-linguistically, and thus immediately comprehensible across the 943 millennia, supports the argument advanced by evolutionary psychologists that human 944 emotional-visceral reactions are fairly invariant and predictable across cultures and 945times, although the process of conceptual blending allows these reactions to be recruited 946 for a potentially infinite variety of rhetorical purposes. Human beings are apparently 947 unique among animals in possessing the cognitive fluidity and cultural technology to 948 effect some radical changes in what gives us pleasure, what we find worth pursuing, and 949 what we deem as meaningful. But all of this cognitive and cultural innovation is 950 grounded in-and remains ultimately constrained by-the nature of our embodiment. 951 This means that, even when confronted by the most alien of cultural practices or 952 artifacts, our own body-minds can serve as a universal decoding key. The tools provided 953 by cognitive linguistics allow us to use this decoding key to uncover and trace the 954embodied origins of the products of the human mind across cultures and across time. 955

The early Chinese argued and thought employing the same cognitive processes as 956 "we" do, and drew upon the same pool of embodied normative values. This is, 957 indeed, the very reason we can understand these texts. Early Chinese philosophical 958 rhetoricians and Enlightenment philosophers of the modern West are engaged in 959 essentially the same sort of argumentative project, employing the same linguistic 960 tools (metaphor and metaphoric blends) to manipulate the same basic cognitive 961 processes (image thinking and affective reasoning). The fact that the early Chinese 962 do tend to highlight the role of metaphor and emotion more than their modern 963 Western counterparts should be seen as an indication that they were a bit less self-964deluded about what they were up to, not as evidence of some cultural-cognitive gulf 965 between the Occident and Orient. Breaking out of the false dichotomies that 966 characterize "reverse Orientalism" means not only getting beyond stereotyped and 967 exaggerated conceptions of early China, but also deconstructing the self-conception 968 of modern Western philosophy that is typically set up as the foil to the "holistic 969 East." One of the great strengths of early Chinese philosophy is that its self-conception 970 seems much more empirically plausible in the light of modern cognition science than 971 recent thought in the West, which in turns makes it an important and rich resource for 972 those who wish to reconceptualize philosophy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Munro 2005). 973 Drawing upon this resource, however, is only possible if we take care to avoid cultural 974 essentialism, and thereby manage to see the unique strengths of early Chinese 975 argumentation against the background of common human cognitive universals. 976

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